Analysis of My Philosophical Proof of a Creator, by Anonymous (continued)
Premise 2: Although this is the majority view within the physics community, I'm not convinced that it's true. William Lane Craig, who advocates the Kalam Cosmological Argument, argues pretty strongly in his book, _Time And Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time_, that the dynamic theory of time is true, not the static. And his argument for God depends on the dynamic theory of time. I find his arguments persuasive. He doesn't deny the general theory of relativity, though, I don't think. Apparently, he thinks it's compatible with a dynamic theory of time.
3: This follows from 1 and 2.
Premise 4: This is necessarily true by the law of excluded middle. A cause can either come from inside the universe or not inside the universe (which is to say, from outside the universe). Those are the only options.
Premise 5: I'm convinced this is true.
6: This follows from 4 and 5.
7: This follows from 3 and 6.
So far, the only reservations I have about your argument are the first and second premise. I suspect that premise 1 is true, but I'm not certain. I'm fairly convinced that premise 2 is false, but I could be wrong, and admittedly, most physicists disagree with me.
A person might object that premise 2 and premise 5 can't both be true at the same time. They might argue that if the universe is static, then not only can there be no causes, but there can be no effects either, in which case there's no reason to suppose that anything outside of the universe is necessary to cause anything within the universe. Or they might affirm both Premise 2 and Premise 5 by denying Premise 1 and arguing that cause and effect are possible even if the universe is static. If I'm not mistaken, that is the route most physicists and philosophers of science take.
Another difficulty is how the outside causes that exist in some hyper time could be related to the time in our universe. Is this hyper time a dynamic time, or is it static as well? If it's static, then doesn't the same argument apply, in which case there's a hyper-hyper-time? This line of reasoning leads to an infinite regress unless you terminate it either with a timeless cause or with a cause that exists in a dynamic time. If you terminate the infinite regress with a dynamic time, then you've got another problem--the problem of an infinite regress of dynamic time. If the final dynamic time has a beginning, then what caused IT to begin, and
Clcik to continue: